Research
Aristotle on Oviparous Generation
My main project looks at how Aristotle applies his theory of sexual reproduction to animals that are not live-bearing, i.e. the ‘lower’ animals that do not reproduce the way humans do—in particular, oviparous (egg-laying) animals. This allows us to make progress not only on interpretive debates about his embryology, but also on questions about the metaphysics and politics of pregnancy and procreation, the relationship of the human to the nonhuman animal, and how science has been used to justify unjust socio-political hierarchies.
My dissertation, ‘Aristotle on Eggs', reconstructs Aristotle’s account of egg-laying from Generation of Animals. I argue: (a) that he distinguishes between the production of an egg and the conception of an embryo that develops inside the egg; (b) that he likely sees as eggs as discontinuous body parts of the animals who lay them; and (c) that his explanation of egg-laying reflects the lower status he assigns to egg-layers, as less perfect than live-bearers like humans. I am now expanding the project into a monograph on Aristotle’s account of oviparous generation, developing the above interpretation and exploring further aspects of oviparity in Aristotle’s zoology.
Paper Projects
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Advance publication online; available here.
Abstract: The generation of hybrid animals, where a mother and father of two different species produce an animal that is a cross between their species, has been thought to pose a challenge to two important principles of Aristotle’s biology: that all species are fixed, and that the father transmits form to the offspring in generation. This paper argues that hybrid generation in Aristotle’s embryology does not give us grounds to reject either of these two principles, by showing that hybrid animals count as ‘monstrosities’ from Generation of Animals IV, animals who belong to the same species as their fathers despite deviating from the morphology of that species.
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Abstract: In Generation of Animals 2.5, Aristotle says that ‘wind-eggs’, unfertilized eggs produced by some female birds or fish without male insemination, possess nutritive soul in potentiality—seemingly contradicting his doctrine of ‘reproductive hylomorphism’, on which the male provides the form or soul to the new animal being generated and the female provides the matter. This paper argues that when Aristotle’s comments about wind-eggs are placed in the context of his account of oviparous generation, they do not contradict the reproductive hylomorphic doctrine. Aristotle distinguishes between the production of an egg and the subsequent conception of the embryo that develops inside the egg, with eggs functioning as uterus analogues. I argue that this means eggs should be understood as parts of the animal that lays them, which possess potential nutritive soul insofar as they are potentially able to perform a reproductive function for the ensouled egg-layer.
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Accepted to volume forthcoming with Springer.
Abstract: One of Aristotle’s methods of embryological research was the observation of chick embryos in eggs, treating eggs as analogous to uteri in order to make inferences about embryos in the uteri of live-bearing animals. This chapter takes up Aristotle’s statement of an egg–uterus analogy in Generation of Animals 3.2 and explores the metaphysical commitments behind it. In particular, it argues that Aristotle thinks of eggs as parts of egg-laying animals because of their functional similarity to the uteri of live-bearing animals.
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Please email for draft
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Please email for draft
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Draft in progress