Research
Aristotle on Oviparous Generation
My main project examines Aristotle’s theory of how egg-laying animals reproduce: that is, how his general explanation for how a new ensouled being is generated out of some bodily fluids is applied to his empirical observations of egg-laying animals (ovipara) like birds and fish, primarily in Generation of Animals. I show that a better grasp of the account of oviparous generation allows us to make progress not only on interpretive debates about Aristotle’s embryology—e.g. about its sexism and its causal framework for natural change—but also on questions about the metaphysics and politics of pregnancy and procreation, the relationship of the human to the nonhuman animal, and how science has been used to maintain unjust socio-political hierarchies.
This continues work begun in my dissertation, ‘Aristotle on Eggs,' where I argue that Aristotle distinguishes between the production of an egg and the conception of an embryo that develops inside the egg, that he likely sees eggs as discontinuous body parts of the animals who lay them, and that his explanation of egg-laying reflects the lower status he assigns egg-layers relative to live-bearers like humans. Two of my forthcoming papers, ‘Wind-Eggs in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals’ and ‘Eggs as External Wombs in Aristotle’s Embryology,’ are fruits of this project; for another paper, currently in progress, I’m looking at the metaphysics and politics of brooding and external gestation for Aristotle.
Paper Projects
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Advance publication online; available here.
Abstract: The generation of hybrid animals, where a mother and father of two different species produce an animal that is a cross between their species, has been thought to pose a challenge to two important principles of Aristotle’s biology: that all species are fixed, and that the father transmits form to the offspring in generation. This paper argues that hybrid generation in Aristotle’s embryology does not give us grounds to reject either of these two principles, by showing that hybrid animals count as ‘monstrosities’ from Generation of Animals IV, animals who belong to the same species as their fathers despite deviating from the morphology of that species.
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This paper was awarded the British Society for the History of Philosophy’s Graduate Essay Prize in 2024.
Abstract: In Generation of Animals 2.5, Aristotle says that ‘wind-eggs’, unfertilized eggs produced by some female birds or fish without male insemination, possess nutritive soul in potentiality—seemingly contradicting his doctrine of ‘reproductive hylomorphism’, on which the male provides the form or soul to the new animal being generated and the female provides the matter. This paper argues that when Aristotle’s comments about wind-eggs are placed in the context of his account of oviparous generation, they do not contradict the reproductive hylomorphic doctrine. Aristotle distinguishes between the production of an egg and the subsequent conception of the embryo that develops inside the egg, with eggs functioning as uterus analogues. I argue that this means eggs should be understood as parts of the animal that lays them, which possess potential nutritive soul insofar as they are potentially able to perform a reproductive function for the ensouled egg-layer.
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Abstract: One of Aristotle’s methods of embryological research was the observation of chick embryos in eggs, treating eggs as analogous to uteri in order to make inferences about embryos in the uteri of live-bearing animals. This chapter takes up Aristotle’s statement of an egg–uterus analogy in Generation of Animals 3.2 and explores the metaphysical commitments behind it. In particular, it argues that Aristotle thinks of eggs as parts of egg-laying animals because of their functional similarity to the uteri of live-bearing animals.
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Please email for draft
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Please email for draft
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Draft in progress